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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Florida has decided a very important issue con-
cerning appellate practice in termination of parental rights cases, ruling that
the United States Supreme Court doctrine established in Anders v. Califor-
nia,' regarding an attorney's withdrawal from an appeal for lack of appeal-
able issues in a criminal case, did not apply to termination of parental rights
cases.2 The Supreme Court of Florida set forth a less onerous standard of
withdrawal The doctrine of prospective neglect has been at issue in a num-
ber of cases in Florida's intermediate appellate courts over an extended pe-
riod of time, including the time period addressed by this article, and no con-
sensus has yet been reached regarding application of the doctrine.' The opin-
ions rendered by the district courts of appeal continue to be in conflict over
proper application of the doctrine.' On the delinquency side, the appellate
courts continued the longstanding practice of holding the trial courts strictly
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. This
article covers cases through June 30, 2003. The author thanks Diane Howard and Gary Scott
Turner who assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
2. N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 2003).
3. Id. at 904.
4. See, e.g., F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
5. See id. at 1124.
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responsible for compliance with statutory provisions, including proper notice
to children of their right to counsel6 and proper application of dispositional
statutes.7 Legislative activity was limited during the past year, although a
major change occurred in the placement of the guardian ad litem program,
which moved from the Supreme Court of Florida to the Justice Administra-
tive Commission.8
II. DEPENDENCY
Florida case law and prior surveys in this Journal have reported on cor-
poral punishment as one of the bases for a finding of dependency.9 The
question under Florida law is whether corporal punishment is excessive
enough to qualify as abuse.' ° In O.S. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies," the appellate court held that the evidence established substantial bruis-
ing over a majority of the child's buttocks, legs, and neck and that some of
the bruises were still present six weeks later. 12 The child also testified that
this was not the most severe beating she had received. 3 The appellate court
upheld the trial court's fact-finding, distinguishing cases in which the court
found that bruises were insignificant, did not constitute temporary disfigure-
ment, and did not put the child at risk of imminent abuse or cause the child to
suffer significant mental impairment.'4
An important question of how to prove the grounds for dependency was
before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in D. Children v. Department of
Children & Family Services. 5 D. Children involved charges against both
parents, the father claimed he was not at home at the time the infant was in-
6. E.g., A.L. v. State, 841 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
7. E.g., Fisher v. State, 840 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
8. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296 (2003).
9. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2001 Survey of Florida Law, 26 NOVA L. REv.
903, 915 (2002).
10. Id. Parents can also be charged with criminal child abuse for excessive corporal
punishment. § 39.01(30)(a)(4). Parental immunity is not a defense to criminal child neglect.
Radford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012, 1019-20 (Fla. 2002) (citing State v. McDonald, 785 So. 2d
640, 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
11. 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
12. Id. at 1148.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1147-48 (citing J.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 1220, 1221
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); R.S.M. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 640 So. 2d 1126
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); see also W.H. v Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 846 So. 2d
636, 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); K.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 784 So. 2d 594,
597 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
15. 820 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
[Vol. 28:3:543
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jured, although he was charged and a dependency finding was made as to
him. ' 6 The mother, however, was at home and dependency was also found as
to her. 7 In a split opinion, the appellate court held that the dependency as to
the father would still be affirmed; even assuming he was not home at the
time of the infant's injury.'8 Moreover, the majority held that the trial court
did not abuse its very broad discretion.' 9 Specifically, the court held that
there was ample evidence to support dependency as to the mother, the perpe-
trator was not identified, and there was an intact family."0 The court also
relied upon an earlier case, In re B.J.,2 1 where a parent's rights were termi-
nated, even though there was no evidence that the parent had inflicted any
abuse. 2 The court stated "'where there is evidence that a child suffered
abuse by one or both of the parents present, there is clear and convincing
evidence of egregious abuse to support termination of parental rights of both
parents."'
23
Judge Warner dissented in the D. Children case.24  First, she distin-
guished In re B.J. on the facts.25 Specifically, she noted that the abuse oc-
cuffed when the mother was in the residence.26 In the case at bar, according
to the dissent, there was no evidence that the father was at home when the
abuse occurred, nor was there any evidence to suggest that the injuries oc-
curred at any time when the father was at home.2 ' Although the majority
opinion states that it does not "'accept as a given, that the father was not in
the home at the time the injury occurred,"' there was no evidence to support
that fact unless one rejects the parties' unreported testimony as not credible.2"
Thus, the majority opinion seems to stand for the proposition that it is not an
abuse of discretion for the court to find dependency as to one parent based
upon acts committed by the other in the absence of the parent and without
16. Id. at 981.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 982 (citing D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
20. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 982.
21. 737 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
22. Id. at 1228.
23. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 984 (Warner, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 983.
25. Id.
26. D. Children v. Department of Children & Family Services 820 So. 2d 980, 984 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 984-85 (Warner, J., dissenting).
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any showing of evidence that the other parent had any involvement in the
behavior which gave rise to the abuse or neglect.29
The second issue in D. Children dealt with the ongoing question of
whether a child may be found dependent based upon abuse or neglect af-
flicted upon a sibling, which is also discussed in the section of this article on
termination of parental rights.3" Relying upon In re MF.3, and D.H. v. De-
partment of Children & Families, 32 the majority recognized that the trial
court cannot rely solely on the existence of one child's injury in finding two
other children dependent.33 Moreover, the majority decided it would "defer
to the trial judge, who heard and observed the witnesses, and resolved the
conflicts and doubts in favor of protecting all three of the children, not just
the one who was abused."34 In so doing, it relied upon a social worker who
testified at the trial level about the lack of explanation for the injury and the
inability to assess the parties' needs to be assessed to ensure the safety of the
children.35 Again, on this ground, Judge Warner dissented.36 She explained
that the social worker never interviewed the children, nor the parents, but
found the same risk for the boys as for the infant girl.37 Relying upon the
precedents supporting the proposition that there has to be some kind of inde-
pendent evidence apart from the single act to allow for a finding of depend-
ency as to two other children, Judge Warner held that "[w]here there is no
evidence to support the trial court's ruling, or where the facts as found by the
trial court do not as a matter of law support the relief granted, no deference
should be given. 38
The issue of prospective neglect regularly comes before the Florida ap-
pellate courts in both dependency and termination of parental rights cases.
As demonstrated by the D. Children case, it usually arises in the context of
prior abuse or neglect of siblings forming the basis of an allegation of "pro-
spective abuse" against the child who is the subject of the present proceed-
ing.39 It can also arise in the context where no child has yet been abused or
29. See id. at 981, 982.
30. Id. at 982.
31. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000).
32. 769 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
33. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 982.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 985 (Warner, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. D. Children v. Department of Children & Family Services 820 So. 2d 980, 986 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). (Warner, J., dissenting).
39. See Dale, supra note 9, at 913; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23
NOVA L. REV. 819, 821-22, 825 (1999).
[Vol. 28:3:543
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neglected but where the parents' behavior suggests prospective neglect.4°
The standard for such termination cases originated in the Supreme Court of
Florida case, Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,4'
decided in 1991. In In re P.S.,42 the question was whether the "court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of the father's prior DUI arrest" in de-
termining whether there was dependency.43 The arrest had occurred six years
before the proceedings and long before the child was born.4 The appellate
court held that such information was not relevant.45 Applying the prospec-
tive neglect standard, and citing Palmer v. Department of Health & Rehabili-
tative Services, 6 the court held that under the standard provided by section
39.01(14)(f) of the Florida Statutes, involving substantial risk of imminent
abuse, abandonment, or neglect, the "court abused its discretion in finding
that the father's single act 'clearly and certainly' predicted future neglect." '47
As reported in this Journal, a trial court can find a child dependent, who
was not being abused, based upon abuse inflicted on a sibling where a
"nexus" exists between the "act of abuse and prospective abuse., 4 8 This was
the conclusion of the court in O.S. v. Department of Children & Families,49
where a severe beating by the mother, intended as corporal punishment, was
likely to be employed on the younger child even though the child had not
been paddled as often as the older sibling.50 In light of the fact that the older
child was no longer in the home, the appellate court upheld the concept that
the younger child might "receive the brunt of the mother's rage" and for that
reason affirmed the dependency finding as to the younger child.5 Another
dependency case predicated on proof of neglect or abuse of other children is
MN. v. Department of Children & Families.52 The question in MN. was
whether an incident of prior neglect or abuse of one child would be sufficient
40. See L.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2002); Hroncich v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 667 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
41. 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
42. 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
43. Id.
44. id.
45. Id.
46. 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
47. P.S., 825 So. 2d at 531.
48. See D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
49. 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
50. Id. at 1149.
51. Id.
52. 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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by itself to establish "a substantial risk of imminent abuse" of another child,
as required by Chapter 39.53 Relying upon a body of Fifth District Court of
Appeal cases, in MN., the court held that independent evidence must be in-
troduced establishing a nexus between the prior abuse or neglect and the
allegation of prospective abuse. 54 An example of a nexus may be a "mental
or emotional condition of [a] parent which will continue, such as mental ill-
ness [or] drug addiction., 55 In the MN. case, the parent did not suffer from a
mental illness but had a below average intellectual ability that resulted in an
adjustment disorder that was neither serious nor disturbing. 6 For that rea-
son, the appellate court held that the Department of Children and Families
("DCF") failed to meet its burden of establishing the sufficient nexus be-
tween the prior abuse of one child and the prospective abuse or neglect of the
other child. 7
In a series of opinions commencing with Beagle v. Beagle,58 the Su-
preme Court of Florida has rejected grandparent intervention in family af-
fairs by means of claims of right to visitation.59 Grandparent visitation rights
arose in a different context in C.S. v. Biddle,6° where grandparents initiated
the dependency proceeding and sought custody of the children. 61 The court
ordered the mother to make the three children available to the grandparents,
in order to permit the grandparents to evaluate the children's medical, dental
and educational circumstances.62 Furthermore, the court ordered the parents
to deliver the children to the grandparents for overnight visitation and author-
ized the grandparents to obtain evaluations of the children, all absent a find-
ing that the children were dependent.63 On a petition for writ of prohibition,
the appellate court granted the writ and quashed the service.' Citing to the
53. Id. at 447 (citing§ 39.01(14)(f)).
54. Id. at 448 (citing K.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 800 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001); Gaines v. Dep't of Children & Families, 711 So. 2d 190, 194 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); O.S., 821 So. 2d at 1145; D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d
424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 449.
58. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
59. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV.
91, 98-99 (2000); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.
2d 26 (Fla. 2000); Von Eiffv. Azicn, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998); Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So. 2d
650 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
60. 829 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1005.
63. Id.
64. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:543
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/6
2003 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW
fundamental rights of parents to raise their children absent a compelling state
interest, as articulated in the Beagle case,65 the appellate court held that
"[w]hen individuals enlist the judicial system to intervene in a parent/child
relationship, the court must scrupulously adhere to the pertinent statutes in
determining whether such interference is warranted."66 The court concluded
that the "status as grandparents does not confer on them any special rights to
direct the upbringing of these children or to visit with the children without
parents' permission.,
67
The failure of parents to appear both at dependency hearings and in
termination of parental rights cases can result in a default judgment. Impor-
tant issues of proper notice and adequate due process protections arise in
these cases. Over a dissent, the Third District Court of Appeals, in L. W. v.
Florida Department of Children & Family Services,68 upheld a default order
of dependency as to a father who failed to appear at an arraignment hearing
where the father's attorney was notified of the hearing and left two recorded
messages for the father.69 The dissent argued that less than twenty-four
hours notice of the arraignment hearing on the dependency proceeding to the
lawyer, while sufficient as a general proposition under Florida law,70 was
insufficient because fundamental rights were at stake and a mere twenty-four
hours notice was inadequate particularly given the lack of assurance that the
father had actually received the notice.7
In another failure to notify case, S.H. v. Department of Children &
Families7 the mother, but not the father, was served at home with a sum-
mons in a dependency proceeding.73 He was at the courthouse on the morn-
ing of the arraignment, "signed an attendance sheet outside of the courtroom
... [but] left the courthouse before the arraignment began. ' 74 The trial court
ruled that he had been properly served by substituted service and entered a
default judgment finding the child dependent. 75 Noting that it was sympa-
65. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996).
66. C.S., 829 So. 2d at 1005.
67. Id.; see also Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
grandparents' lack of liberty interest in making decisions about care, custody, and control of
their grandchildren).
68. 829 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
69. Id. at 939.
70. See M.E. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
71. L.W., 829 So. 2d at 940.
72. 837 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
2004]
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thetic to the "considered ruling of the trial judge,"76 the court reversed based
upon the language of Chapter 39 regarding service of process.77 The court
found that the father's signing of the attendance sheet did not constitute ap-
pearance in a hearing before the court as required by Florida law.78 Further-
more, there was no substituted service on the father "because the mother's
residence was not [the father's] 'usual place of abode' at the time of ser-
vice. ' 9 Finally, the father's knowledge of the dependency proceeding is not
enough to waive the statutory service requirement.80 In addition, this was not
a case of deliberate refusal to accept delivery of service.8' Thus, "[t]he order
of disposition with respect to the father [was] reversed. 82
In the third case involving default at the dependency hearing stage, AJ
v. Department of Children & Families Services," parents, who had attended
two days of trial and many hearings in their dependency case suffered a de-
fault judgment and consent order against them when they were twenty-five
minutes late for the commencement of the third day of trial in Miami.84 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's order on grounds
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the parents' motion to set
aside the default judgment. 85 The appellate court recognized that the purpose
behind the statutory authority enabling the court to enter a default order at
this stage is to avoid the parents defeating the object of the dependency pro-
ceeding through neglect and further that the court has the authority to bring
the case to a conclusion even if the parents do not participate. 86 However,
the appeals court noted, nonetheless, that "[t]he purpose of the statute is not
to inject 'gotcha' practices into the dependency process."87 Under the facts
of the case, the lower court abused its discretion in deciding the case by way
of a default rather than the merits.88
There are times when at the end of the dependency proceeding the re-
maining issue is one of custody. In L.F. v. Department of Children & Family
76. Id. at 1118.
77. S.H., 837 So. 2d at 1118.
78. Id.; see § 39.502(2).
79. S.H.,837So. 2dat 1118.
80. Id. (citing Bedford Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1225-27 (Fla.
1984) (finding that actual notice does not render attempted service valid)).
81. S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 837 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
82. Id. at 1120.
83. 845 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
84. Id. at 974.
85. Id. at 976.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. A.J., 845 So. 2d at 976.
[Vol. 28:3:543
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Services," two half siblings resided with their natural father/step-father in
Georgia during the course of a dependency proceeding against the mother.9°
At the end of the proceeding, the court, having previously found dependency,
ordered both reunification and strengthening/maintaining the current place-
ment, placing custody of both children with the natural father of one who
was also the step-father of the other.9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed because, while under the dependency statute the court was within its
discretion to use the best interest standard to determine which parent should
have custody of the dependant child, the step-father was neither a parent nor
a relative under the Florida statute to whom custody might go.92 Thus, the
court remanded to consider how the parties might resolve long-term custody
and whether a new case plan might be appropriate.93
S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem,94 involved an important issue of a juvenile's
right to privacy in the context of a dependency proceeding. S.C., a child of
fourteen, was the subject of a dependency proceeding and had a guardian ad
litem appointed on her behalf.95 In the course of the proceeding against the
mother, the child sought to maintain the privacy of information contained in
her records held by a former therapist and psychologist.96 In an effort to
avoid release of the information to her guardian ad litem, the child "moved to
enjoin the guardian ad litem program, and any individual guardian ad litem
assigned, from obtaining any confidential or privileged records" in the ab-
sence of the formal petition or hearing as provided under Florida law. 97 Con-
sequently, because the doctor was going to be called at the adjudicatory hear-
ing, the child sought to enjoin anyone from calling the doctor.98
On a writ of certiorari, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded
that the order denying the child's motion violated Florida law by failing to
allow the child, fourteen years of age, an opportunity to be heard.99 It did not
rule on the issue of maturity or competency of the minor to seek the relief.'
The court concluded that the child had a right to assert the therapist-patient
89. 837 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
90. Id. at 1099.
91. Id. at 1101.
92. Id. at 1102 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(49), (60) (2002)).
93. Id. at 1104.
94. 845 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
95. Id. at 955.
96. Id. at 955-56.
97. Id. at 956.
98. Id.
99. S.C., 845 So. 2d at 956.
100. Id.
2004]
9
Dale: 2003 Survey of Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA W REVIEW
privilege, and that nothing contained in Chapter 3910 provided the guardian
ad litem with the right to review the privileged records of the dependent
child. 1 2 The power of the guardian ad litem found in Section 61.403(2) does
not authorize the guardian ad litem to obtain confidential psychotherapist-
patient records absent the child's right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard to challenge such access.' °3 The court recognized the child's right of
privacy under the Florida Constitution and case law." Moreover, the court
concluded that the child had the right to notice and the opportunity to be
heard, that the matter should be resolved in camera giving the child the op-
portunity to be heard, and that such was the least restrictive and intrusive
means of determining whether the material should be made available.
0 5
Finally, the court relied upon case law from California, °6 and a body of pro-
fessional literature to support the proposition that mature minors have pri-
vacy interests that ought to be recognized in medical decision-making con-
texts.'O7 It is also significant that the child in this case had a lawyer from a
legal aid program representing her. Under Florida law, the child has no right
to counsel in a dependency proceeding but is only entitled to representation
by the guardian ad litem with whom she was at odds in this case.'0 8
Jurisdiction of the dependency court over a family that had no ties to the
state of Florida and was merely in transit when the children were seized at
Miami International Airport was before the Third District Court of Appeal in
K.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services.'0 9 The case involved a
father from Trinidad who was living with his wife, an employee of the U.S.
State Department posted in Brazil, but who was not the mother of his chil-
dren. " The father, according to the appellate court, disciplined his daughter
by striking her on the buttocks repeatedly with a wooden stick, leaving
bruises and abrasions."' The discipline took place on U.S. Embassy prop-
erty in Brazil." 2 Believing that the family might abscond to Trinidad, the
101. See FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(21) (2003).
102. Id.
103. § 61.403(2).
104. S.C., 845 So. 2d at 958 (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23; In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
(Fla. 1989)).
105. S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 959 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
106. Id. (citing In re Kristine W., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369 (Ct. App. 2001)).
107. Id. (citing Kristine W., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373-74).
108. See generally Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Pro-
ceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2001).
109. 846 So. 2d 544, 545-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
110. Id. at 546.
111. Id.
112. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:543
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State Department detained them and the children were taken into the DCF
custody when their plane arrived at Miami International Airport."3 Despite
its statement that "[w]e agree with the father that their case raises serious
concerns over jurisdiction, as the family had no ties to the State of Flor-
ida,"' 14 the court held that under section 39.40(2) of the Florida Statutes, it
has original jurisdiction when a child is taken into custody by the DCF."5
The court also found that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
applicable in Florida pursuant to section 61.503(4) of the Florida Statutes,
the dependency court had emergency jurisdiction over a child who was pre-
sent in the State of Florida." 6 In addition, it noted that no proceedings were
brought in Virginia." 7 It upheld the jurisdiction despite the fact that it rec-
ognized that jurisdiction was created by acts of the U.S. State Department
and Florida officials.' 18
And finally, in a statement that is becoming redundant in appellate deci-
sions, the court concluded its opinion by stating that "[t]his case presents yet
another unfortunate failure of the Department of Children and Families and
the court system to fulfill their statutory duties to the children and the fam-
ily." 11
9
For well over a decade the appellate courts and this author have com-
mented on the failure of the dependency trial court to state the facts upon
which findings of dependency are made. 2 ° In MS. v. Department of Chil-
dren & Families,2' the court was faced with the same problem and, once
again, it reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to adequately
state facts upon which the conclusion of abuse was made, or to state any
facts to support the conclusions that the relationship between the mother and
her child was unhealthy but simply tracked the factual allegations of the
amended petition for dependency.'22
113. Id.
114. K.H., 846 So. 2d at 546.
115. Id. at 547.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. K.H., 846 So. 2d at 547.
120. See In re T.S., 557 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Williams v. Dep't
of Health & Rehab. Servs., 568 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also J.C.G.
v. Dep't of Children & Families, 780 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Michael J.
Dale, Juvenile Law Color: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REv. 139, 140 (1994).
121. 827 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
122. Id. at 1090.
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III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration provide that the parties must
consent for testimony to take place through the use of communication
equipment rather than in court.13 In A.B. v. Department of Children & Fam-
ily Services,'24 the appeals court reversed in a case where the trial court took
testimony of a treating psychiatrist as well as a former foster parent of the
child via telephone over objections by the mother's counsel. 125 The court
held that given the seriousness of the witnesses' testimony and the nature of
the issue in the case the use of telephone testimony without the mother's
consent violated the mother's due process rights. 1
26
Florida law provides that in a termination of parental rights case one of
the grounds for termination is the setting where a case plan has been filed, a
child has been previously adjudicated dependent and the child continues to
be abused, neglected and abandoned by the parents.127 That issue is clear on
its face. However, in In re T.B., 2 s the intermediate appellate court reversed
because the child was never declared dependent, the father "had no tasks to
complete under the case plan he was given, there was no factual basis to find
that he failed to substantially comply with the [case] plan."'' 29
The issue of whether the failure of parents to appear at termination pro-
ceedings may constitute grounds for default termination of parental rights
has been before the appellate courts on a number of occasions.13 As it has in
the dependency context, 13' in C.R.K. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies,132 the trial court defaulted a mother at a calendar call for failure to ap-
pear after having been given notice. 133 "The mother's attorney was present,
123. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.07 1(d).
124. 820 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
125. Id. at 1086.
126. Id.
127. § 39.806(l)(e).
128. 819 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
129. Id. at 272.
130. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1998 Survey of Florida Law, 24 NOVA L. REV. 179
(1999).
131. See infra Part 11.
132. 826 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
133. Id. at 1054. The notice provision provided "Termination of failure to personally
appear at the advisory hearing constitutes consent to termination of parental rights of the
child(ren). If you fail to personally appear on the date and time specified, you may lose all
legal rights as a parent to the child(ren)." Id.
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but the mother was not."' 34 Nonetheless, the trial court went forward and
took testimony on the second part of the Florida test for termination of paren-
tal rights-manifest best interest of the children.'35 The appellate court re-
versed finding that the trial court had entered a default at the calendar call.' 36
The appellate court held that the "calendar call is not an adjudicatory hear-
ing" which is the event where failure to appear can produce a default.'3 7 For
that reason, the appellate court held that the notice was inadequate.'38 Sec-
tion 39.801(3)(v) of the Florida Statutes refers specifically to the failure of a
parent to appear at the adjudicatory hearing.'39 The court therefore re-
versed. 4 ° As a matter of fundamental due process, a parent in a termination
of parental rights case is entitled to notice by service of the petition, plead-
ings, and other papers.'
41
In MJ. W. v. Department of Children & Families,42 the question was
whether the trial court could hold an adjudicatory hearing where the mother
was never served in compliance with the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure and the statute. "43 Under the facts of the case, the mother learned of the
hearing through telephone conversations but was never served in compliance
with the statute by officials from DeKalb County, Georgia, where she
lived. 44 The appellate court reversed the adjudication of termination of pa-
rental rights finding that the statute and the rule provide for the sole manner
to effectuate service in a parental termination proceeding-either personal
service or constructive service. 45 Neither happened here, and thus, the court
reversed. 4
6
A second case involving termination of parental rights and the question
of proper service upon a parent who fails to appear is J.M v. Department of
Children & Families. 47 In J.M, when the DCF filed its petition to terminate
parental rights to appellant's three children, the DCF could not serve the in-
dividual personally so it sought service through publication as required by
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. C.R.K., 826 So. 2d at 1055.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. § 39.801(3)(v).
140. See also In re C.R., 806 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
141. See generally § 89.801(1).
142. 825 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
143. Id. at 1039.
144. Id. at 1039-40.
145. Id. at 1040-41.
146. Id.
147. 833 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
2004]
13
Dale: 2003 Survey of Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
Florida law.'4 8 The problem the DCF faced was that when it published no-
tice of the termination of parental rights, it did so less than twenty-eight days
before the advisory hearing. 49 Florida statute requires that written defenses
be filed with the Clerk not later than the date set in the notice, which shall
not be less than twenty-eight nor more than sixty days after the first publica-
tion of the notice. 5 ° The fact that the parent had a lawyer is not dispositive
of the issue, according to the appellate court, because that makes it clear that
the issue was the initial notification, not the presence of counsel. 5 ' Subse-
quent notification can be served upon the lawyer and such notification will
be appropriate, as the court held in ME. v. Florida Department of Children
& Family Services. 52 Because fundamental rights are at issue, strict adher-
ence to notice requirements is required and for that reason the court reversed
and remanded. 5 3  It is also significant that the court cited Santosky v.
Kramer,54 which speaks to the significant interests on a constitutional basis
of parents in termination cases. 1
55
Section 39.806(l)(i) allows for termination of parental rights to one
child where parental rights have previously been terminated involuntarily to
a sibling.'56 Two appellate courts recently dealt with the related issue of rec-
ognizing a termination of parental rights order from another state in an ongo-
ing proceeding within Florida. 157 In Department of Children & Families v.
V. V., "'58 a mother in a Florida termination case had her rights terminated as to
a different child in Mississippi under circumstances where she was not af-
forded counsel. 5 9 Nonetheless, the court in V. V. held that "[p]rinciples of
comity and of full faith and credit demand that the judgment be recognized.
No paramount rule of public policy dictates otherwise."' 60 In J.H.K., the
appellate court reversed the dismissal of a termination case and remanded for
new hearing so that the DCF could offer evidence surrounding a New Mex-
ico termination, according to the court, based upon the presumption arising
148. Id. at 280 (citing § 49.09).
149. Id. at 281.
150. § 49.011(13).
151. J.M., 833 So. 2d at 282.
152. 728 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
153. J.M., 833 So. 2d at 282-83.
154. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
155. Id.
156. § 39.806(1)(i).
157. Dep't of Children & Families v. J.H.K, 834 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Dep't of Children & Families v. V.V., 822 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
158. 822 So. 2d at 555-56.
159. Id. at 558.
160. Id.
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from the prior termination.' 6 The court's analysis is troubling, in addition to
being so simplistic and lacking in analysis.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services 62 recognized the importance of the protected liberty
interest to parents, even though it held there was no absolute right to counsel
in a termination of parental rights case. 163 Not looking behind the termina-
tion decree in the other jurisdiction raises basic constitutional questions.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the concept of a
collateral attack upon judgments of other jurisdictions if they lack fairness. "
The seminal United States Supreme Court case, Williams v. North Caro-
lina,165 demonstrates this proposition in the context of recognition of foreign
divorce decrees.
The issue of the appointment of a guardian ad litem continues before the
appellate courts in Florida. In G.S. v. Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices, 16 6 the appellate court reversed the trial court in a termination of paren-
tal rights case for failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the inter-
ests of the minor child.167 With little discussion, the appellate court cited
Florida law that requires a trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the best interests of a child in any termination of parental rights proceed-
ing if a guardian ad litem had not been previously appointed. 68 Despite the
fact that the court in G.S. described the failure to appoint a guardian as a
clear violation of the statutory mandate, and the fact that the federal funding
statute, the Childhood Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
("CAPTA") 169 requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a depend-
ency proceeding, there is Florida case law that inexplicably accepts the fail-
ure to either appoint or continue the appointment of a guardian ad litem in
dependency and termination cases. 1
70
161. J.H.K, 834 So. 2d at 299.
162. 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
163. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33.
164. See id. at 33-34.
165. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
166. 838 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
167. Id. at 1222.
168. Id. (citing § 39.808(2); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.5 10(A)(2)(c)).
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-19 (2000).
170. For a discussion of this issue see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in
Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 797 (2001).
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B. Appellate Issues
The Supreme Court of Florida has decided the issue of whether the pro-
cedures set forth in Anders v. California,7' in which the United States Su-
preme Court enunciated the method by which counsel for an indigent defen-
dant in a criminal case could withdraw from the appeal on grounds that there
is no valid basis to appeal, applies to a termination of parental rights case. In
Anders the United States Supreme Court ruled that when an attorney for an
indigent defendant believes the case on appeal to be wholly frivolous, the
lawyer may seek permission to withdraw after conscientious examination of
the record. However, the attorney must submit a brief referring to anything
in the record that the lawyer believes might reasonably support the appeal.1
2
Since 1971, Florida has applied the Anders procedure to criminal appeals in
this state.'7 3 In N.S.H. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices,' 4 the Supreme Court of Florida held that Anders did not apply to ter-
mination of parental rights cases.'75 It did so, despite the fact that it had ear-
lier expanded the Anders procedures to appeals of involuntary civil commit-
ment to mental health facilities, where a person's physical liberty was at is-
sue.'7 6 The court in N.S.H. held that the Anders procedures were not neces-
sary in a termination of parental rights case because the risks at stake were
not the same. 77 The court held that there was no loss of liberty in the termi-
nation of parental rights setting.'78 The court also noted that the interests at
stake were not just of the parents but also those of the child. 7 9 The court
believed that because termination cases, apparently unlike criminal cases,
involved extensive fact-patterns, the burden placed on the appellate court in
reviewing extensive records would be a substantial burden. Finally, the court
applied the three-part test of Matthews v. Eldridge8" to conclude that there
was no due process violation in the failure to require the Anders process to
be employed in termination of parental rights proceeding. 18 ' The court did,
however, set up a procedure for withdrawal by appellate counsel. It relied
171. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
172. Id. at 744.
173. State v. Wooden, 246 So. 2d 755, 757-58 (Fla. 1971), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. First Dist. Ct. of App., 569 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1990).
174. 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2003).
175. Id. at 900.
176. Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1120 (Fla. 2001).
177. N.S.H., 843 So. 2d at 902.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
181. N.S.H., 843 So. 2d at 903.
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upon the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in Ostrum v. Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Services,82 which held that the attorney should
file a motion seeking leave to withdraw, along with a certification. 3
[W]here appellate counsel seeks leave to withdraw from representation of
an indigent parent in a termination of parental rights case, the motion to
withdraw shall be served on the client and contain a certification that after
a conscientious review of the record the attorney has determined in good
faith that there are no meritorious grounds on which to base an appeal.
The parent shall then be provided the opportunity to file a brief on his or
her own behalf. 1
84
IV. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE AND NEGLECT
Prospective abuse and/or neglect occurs in both dependency proceed-
ings and termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases.'85 This is an important
topic that has been the subject of a number of appellate cases in both settings
this year, and for this reason it is addressed separately in this survey. "The
issue in prospective neglect or abuse cases is whether future behavior, which
will adversely affect the child, can be clearly and certainly predicted." '186 The
genesis for predicting a parent's future behavior can be the prior abuse or
neglect of a sibling.'87 It can also be a finding of "substantial risk of immi-
nent abuse ... or neglect,"' 88 usually stemming from a showing in the record
that the parent's behavior "was beyond the parent's control, likely to con-
tinue, and placed the child at risk,"' 89 but where there was no prior finding of
abuse or neglect of another child. The most often cited behavioral conditions
in the latter setting include mental illness, drug addiction, or pedophilia 90
182. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
183. Id. at 1361.
184. N.S.H., 843 So. 2d at 904.
185. Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
186. Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
187. M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
188. Id.
189. Gaines v. Dep't of Children & Families, 711 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
190. Id. Addressing conflict between circuits regarding whether a dependency ruling could
be based entirely upon the commission of a single sex act on a different child, the Supreme
Court of Florida held in In re MF. that courts should focus on a totality of circumstances in
each case and not rely upon only "one particular fact." 770 So. 2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 2000). In
MF., the father who had committed the sex act on his child had been incarcerated for the
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The Supreme Court of Florida initially addressed prospective abuse or
neglect in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services'91 in
1991. The court held that permanent termination of rights in one child be-
cause of abuse or neglect could be sufficient grounds to terminate parental
rights to a different child.' 92 However, because fundamental liberty interests
are at stake in a TPR case, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "the state
must show by clear and convincing evidence that reunification with the par-
ent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child."' 93 Further, the
state must show that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting
the child from harm by the parent.1
94
There is continuing appellate conflict over the appropriate application
of the prospective abuse and neglect doctrine, particularly in termination
cases. In A.B. v. Department of Children & Families, the mother appealed
an order terminating her parental rights claiming that termination, under sec-
tion 39.806(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes, was unconstitutional because the
statute allowed termination "without regard for extraneous circumstances,
depriv[ing] parents of the fundamental liberty interests they have in deter-
mining the care and upbringing of their children."' 95 The court stated that
"implicit in the recognition of neglect or abuse of other children as a ground
for termination of parental rights to a different child is the absence of any
factor that would evince a break in the chain of demonstrated parental fail-
ure."'196 In effect, this created a rebuttable presumption of prospective ne-
glect or abuse whenever there had been a prior termination under conditions
of abuse or neglect, shifting the burden to the parent to prove that past con-
duct, condition, or circumstances could not serve as a "predictor" of future
behavior. 97 This appears to be at odds with Padgett's mandate that the State
crime. Id. at 1194. DCF sought a dependency determination based upon this act rather than
upon the totality of the circumstances, which included the fact that the father would be incar-
cerated for a "substantial portion of the children's years of minority." Id The Supreme Court
of Florida approved the lower court's result, but disapproved the remainder of the lower
court's opinion for failure to apply the totality of the t ircumstances test. Id. at 1194-95.
191. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
192. Id.at 571.
193. Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
194. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. The evidentiary standard required in a dependency pro-
ceeding is a preponderance of the evidence. M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d
445, 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
195. 816 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In A.B., the mother appealed a
termination based upon a prior termination of her rights in a different child at the age of one
month because of the child's medical problems. Id. at 684.
196. Id. at 686.
197. Id.
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clearly and convincingly show imminent harm to the child,'98 and is in direct
conflict with the Fourth District's subsequent decision in F.L. v. Department
of Children & Families.'99
Several months later, in his concurrence and dissent to C. W v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families,20° a First District case, Judge Ervin expressed
doubt over whether the Legislature can "trump" a parent's liberty interest in
raising children by allowing a termination proceeding based solely upon that
parent's past egregious conduct to another child without requiring some
"proof of a causal connection between the prior conduct and the parent's
current conduct with the child sought to be committed. 2 0' Then, in Depart-
ment of Children & Families v. B.B.,2 °2 a Fifth District case involving termi-
nation of parental rights to seven children based upon the sexual abuse of an
eighth child, the court addressed the "current uncertainty in the law," ac-
knowledging potential constitutional issues and a need for the least restric-
tive means of protecting a child.2 °3 This uncertainty became manifest in F.L.
v. Department of Children & Families.204 The Fourth District reversed a
termination that had been based solely upon involuntary termination of rights
to a prior child.25 The court held that termination under section 39.806(1)(i)
"unconstitutionally shifted the burden to the parent to prove that reunifica-
tion would not be harmful to the child,, 20 6 stating that the "DCF carries the
198. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
199. 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
200. 814 So. 2d 488, 493 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
201. Id. at 496. In C. W., the mother's rights to her child were terminated because she had
lost her rights to three of the child's siblings involuntarily and had surrendered her rights to a
fourth child. Id. at 491. The court found that she had not remedied the situations leading to
these prior terminations and affirmed the termination of her rights to the fifth child. Id.
202. 824 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In B.B., the father, a polygamist,
"married" his natural daughter, consummating the marriage when she was twelve years old.
Id. at 1002.
203. Id. at 1007-08. The court stated that there may be constitutional implications in a
termination proceeding because a parent has a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
care, custody, and management of his or her child." Id. at 1008.
204. 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The mother appealed a termination
of her rights in her seventh child that had been based upon her voluntary surrender of her first
four children, and DCF's attempted termination of her rights in her fifth and sixth children
because of medical neglect. Id. at 1116. After mediation, the mother surrendered her rights to
the fifth child and her rights to the sixth were terminated because she had failed to comply
with the DCF case plans. Id. at 1116-17. However, the record for termination proceedings for
the seventh child showed extensive evidence that the mother was taking appropriate care of
this child, voluntarily attending parenting classes, living on her own, and holding down a job.
Id. at 1118-19.
205. Id. at 1124.
206. F.L.,849So.2dat 1116.
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burden not only to establish a ground for termination but the continuing sub-
stantial risk of harm to the current child."2 °7 There is far more accord among
the district courts of appeal in dependency proceedings involving prospective
abuse or neglect. In O.S. v. Department of Children & Families,°8 the DCF
initiated a dependency action for two children based upon a mother's exces-
sive corporal punishment of one of the children.2 9 Relying upon J. C. v. De-
partment of Children & Families,21° the mother claimed that corporal pun-
ishment in and of itself was not sufficient to order dependency.21  However,
the court held that the evidence supported a charge of abuse, based upon
substantial bruising that was present six weeks after the incident and evi-
dence of mental injury to the child.2 12 Furthermore, the court held that de-
pendency could be found as to the second child who had not been beaten,
when the evidence "support[ed] a nexus between the act of abuse and any
prospective abuse to another sibling. 213
The concept of nexus is a key issue in a line of dependency cases deal-
ing both with step-children and natural children. In MN. v. Department of
Children & Families,214 the Fifth District held that evidence that a father had
abused a step-child was not sufficient to find that his natural child was de-
pendent, stating that additional proof in the form of independent evidence
was required to prove a nexus between the past abuse and the prospective
abuse.2 5 The court went on to say that this nexus was most often established
through the presence of an ongoing mental or emotional condition of the
parent.2  The father had been shown to have below average intellectual abil-
ity. However, this did not constitute a mental condition that would make the
allegations of future abuse likely.217 Likewise, in In re C.Af' 8 a father's bio-
logical children were adjudicated dependent based solely upon evidence that
the father had abused his step-children.2'9 However, the Second District
Court of Appeal found that the evidence relied upon by the DCF was insuffi-
207. Id. at 1122.
208. 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
209. Id. at 1146.
210. 773 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
211. O.S., 821 So. 2d at 1146. For further discussion of corporal punishment, see infra
Part II.A.
212. Id. at 1148.
213. Id.
214. 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
215. Id. at 447-48.
216. Id. at 448.
217. Id. at 449.
218. 844 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
219. Id.
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cient to establish a nexus between the abuse of the step-children and prospec-
tive abuse of his biological children, and the DCF provided no evidence of
an ongoing condition that would make abuse of his natural children highly
probable.2 °
The Fourth District continued this line of reasoning in J.B.P.F. v. De-
partment of Children & Families.22' Here, the court held that the evidence
was insufficient to establish a nexus between one instance of a mother's
abuse of her son and the risk of prospective abuse of her other child. 2  Al-
though both were the mother's natural children, the court looked at evidence
showing that the son suffered "severe psychological and behavioral prob-
lems," making him extremely difficult to discipline.223 The other child was
well adjusted, and the dynamic between this child and the mother was quite
different from the dynamic between the son and the mother.224 However, the
court also noted that there was evidence of domestic violence between the
mother and her live-in boyfriend that had perhaps occurred in the presence of
this second child.225 Section 39.01(30)(i) of the Florida Statutes allows do-
mestic violence in the presence of children to serve as the basis for harm to
the child.26 Unwilling to reverse the dependency adjudication outright based
upon this evidence of domestic violence, the court remanded the case for a
factual determination of whether the child ought to be adjudicated dependent
based upon the domestic violence.227
Another dependency case addressed the question of whether a father's
six-year-old DUI conviction could serve as the basis for a charge of prospec-
tive neglect to render a child dependent.228 In P.S. v. Department of Children
& Families, discussed in the "Dependency" section above, the Second Dis-
trict held that the DUI arrest was too remote in time, having occurred even
before the child was born, to predict clearly and convincingly any substantial
220. Id. at 766.
221. 837 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
222. Id. The son had been adjudicated dependent based upon an incident of "excessive"
discipline where the mother and her live-in boyfriend physically restrained the child with
handcuffs and poured an entire bottle of hot sauce into his mouth. Id. at 1109. The court noted
that the mother had sought help with the son, acknowledging her difficulty in raising him by
initiating contact with DCF to get assistance in parenting him appropriately. Id. at 1110.
223. Id. at 1108.
224. J.B.P.F., 837 So. 2d at 1110.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1I11.
228. P.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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risk to the child.229 In fact, the court noted that evidence of the arrest was not
relevant to any material fact at issue.23 °
In D. Children v. Department of Children & Families,23 ' also discussed
in the "Dependency" section above, the court upheld the dependency of the
three children as to both the mother and the father, based upon the apparent
abuse or neglect of one child.232 The court looked at the totality of the cir-
cumstances, as per ME..,233 noting that the court had broad discretion when
dealing with child welfare, that there was sufficient evidence to affirm de-
pendency as to the mother, the perpetrator of the abuse had not been estab-
lished, and the family was intact with both parents being the only adults who
had access to the abused infant prior to injury.3
Although the districts have been consistent in the treatment of prospec-
tive neglect and abuse in a dependency setting, it is clear that the application
of the doctrine in the context of termination of parental rights is an issue rife
with uncertainty among Florida's appellate courts. This issue will continue
to stir up conflict until the matter is ultimately resolved by the Supreme
Court of Florida.
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
It is a basic principle that the prosecutor in criminal and juvenile delin-
quency cases has the authority relating to the allocation of prosecutorial re-
sources and may use discretion in deciding which cases to file charges.2 35 In
State v. D. W.,236 the State filed a petition for delinquency against a child for
threatening a teacher.237 After reading the arrest report the trial judge, sua
sponte, dismissed the petition with prejudice.238 The State appealed and the
appellate court reversed.239 It held that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 820 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
232. Id.
233. In re M.F., 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000).
234. D. Children, 820 So. 2d at 982. Police never identified who caused the injury. Id. at
981. In a somewhat bizarre twist, the mother told medical personnel that she thought the
injury had been caused by the family Dachshund. Id. None of the experts who testified found
this claim credible. Id.
235. See generally State v. Earl, 545 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
236. 821 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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the court did not have the power to dismiss without giving the State an op-
portunity to present evidence. 4 ° While the court did review the arrest report,
such review did not constitute proper substitute for the State's presentation of
evidence.24'
Sometimes juveniles claim they are adults when arrested in order to
bond out of jail rather than be held in secure detention for twenty-one days,
as required by Florida law. In T. W. v. Jenne242 a child who was fifteen, but
represented that he was eighteen, brought a writ of habeas corpus for release
from the Broward County Jail.243 The juvenile had been released on bond,
but when he missed his court appearance he was held in the adult jail without
bond.244 The writ sought a determination that he was a juvenile and that he
should be treated as such.245 In an earlier case, Williams v. State,246 the juve-
nile who had lied about his age to obtain a favorable probation sentence was
sentenced to 364 days in jail for violation of probation.247 The child, who it
turns out, was sixteen, moved to vacate the adult conviction and sentence.248
The appellate court in Williams held that the child had waived his right to be
treated as a juvenile by lying about his age and failing to disclose his age at a
plea conference to secure a favorable bond and probation sentence. 249 The
court in T.W. distinguished Williams on the grounds that the correction
sought in T. W. occurred early in the case rather than after receiving a more
beneficial and lenient sentence as in Williams.250 The court concluded in
T.W that the child did not "unalterably waive" his right to be treated as a
juvenile.25'
School students often make threats, sometimes of violent activities, and
such behavior has been the subject of substantial discussion in the media. 2
Such threats often result in charges of juvenile delinquency. Section 790.163
of the Florida Statutes provides that "it is unlawful for any person to make a
false report, with intent to deceive, mislead, or otherwise misinform any per-
240. Id.
241. D.W., 821 So. 2dat 1180.
242. 826 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 536-37.
246. 754 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
247. Id. at 68.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citing Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
250. TW., 826 So. 2d at 537.
251. Id.
252. An Epidemic of Violence Incidents in Schools Rise Sharply Since Santee Shooting,
CNN.coM, Mar. 8, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/08/alarming.incidents/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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son, concerning the placing or planting of any bomb, dynamite, or other
deadly explosive." In D.B. v. State,253 a juvenile public school student made
"threats to school officials that he would 'blow up' or 'burn down' his school
at some time in the future. ' 54 He was adjudicated delinquent upon those
threats.255 The appellate court held that threats of future activity were not a
violation of the statute.256 The court found that the threats could not fairly
be characterized as a "false report" under the statute.2 157 The First District
Court of Appeal relied upon an earlier decision by Maryland's highest court,
in Moosavi v. State,258 in which that court recognized that the crux of its stat-
ute was a finding that the telephone, mail, or other transmission was of false
information.259 Thus, the Florida court in D.B. reversed the adjudication for
the same reason-no showing of a false statement.26°
In a second case involving the issue of unlawfully making a false report
of a bomb, 26' a juvenile appealed from a disposition that committed him to
the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") for high-risk residential place-
ment and then probation in C.C.B. v. State.262 After the adjudication, the DJJ
recommended in its report that the court place the child on probation and
withhold adjudication of the delinquency. 263 Departing from the DJJ recom-
mendation, the trial court found that in 2001 there had been an epidemic of
bomb threats made by young people and that it was necessary to send a mes-
sage to other young people in the community, despite the fact that the child
had no prior record. 6 In C. C.B., the appellate court reversed.265 Ruling as
it had in an earlier case in In re A.C.N.,266 the First District Court of Appeals
held that a court's desire to send a message to the community's youth is not a
valid reason for disregarding the recommendation of the DJJ. 267 Further, the
court was required to explain why the commitment was necessary for a child
who had no prior criminal record and why it was important for the safety of
253. 825 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1044.
256. Id. at 1043.
257. Id. at 1043-44.
258. 736 A.2d 285 (Md. 1999).
259. Id. at 291.
260. D.B., 825 So. 2d at 1044.
261. See § 790.163.
262. 828 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 433.
266. 727 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
267. Id.
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the community.268 Because the departure was not supported by competent
substantial evidence, the appeals court in CCB. reversed.269
Minors may be adjudicated delinquent on the basis of searches con-
ducted in school. In 1985, the Supreme Court decided New Jersey v.
T.L. 0., 270 where the Court established that school officials must have a rea-
sonable ground to suspect that the search would result in evidence that the
student has violated either the law or school rules.27' A.N.H. v. State,272 was a
case where a school teacher advised a school counselor that the teacher was
concerned about a student.273 The teacher, believing that the child "was not
'acting himself,' had bloodshot eyes, and that 'something wasn't right,"'
requested that the student empty his front pockets, where he discovered mari-
juana.274 Relying upon T.L.O., the appellate court held that the student's be-
havior could have resulted from a variety of non-criminal circumstances and,
as such, did not rise to reasonable grounds to suspect the child was involved
in criminal activity.275 The appellate court reversed.276
The battle over constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances contin-
ues in Florida. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Florida, in TM v. State,
277
and MR. v. State,278 involving juvenile curfew ordinances in the city of Pi-
nellas Park and Tampa, ruled that the Second District Court of Appeal had
applied a heightened scrutiny test rather than the strict scrutiny test, and thus
remanded. 79 On remand, the court in J.P. v. State,280 and MR. v. State,
28
'
held that the ordinance in Tampa was unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
standard and the Supreme Court of Florida noted jurisdiction in both cases.282
The State often seeks to hold delinquents in pretrial detention past the
twenty-one days as provided by Florida law283 when the state intends to file
other charges against the child.284 For the second time, a Florida appeals
268. Id.
269. C.CB., 828 So. 2d at 433.
270. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
271. Id. at 341.
272. 832 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
273. Id. at 171.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 172.
276. Id.
277. 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001).
278. 788 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 2001).
279. T.M, 784 So. 2d at 443-44 ; MR., 788 So. 2d at 958.
280. 832 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
281. 832 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
282. JP., 832 So. 2d at 113-14; MR., 832 So. 2d at 122.
283. See § 985.215(5)(c).
284. Id.
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court has held that extending detention for an additional period of time based
upon the state's articulation of intent to file charges in adult court without a
showing of good cause is impermissible.2"5 The court thus ruled that the trial
court lacked grounds to continue the detention despite the fact that it dis-
missed the child's petition for writ of certiorari as moot while deciding theissue .28 Good cause would involve such circumstances as where witnesses
were unavailable or an investigation was incomplete.287
For over a decade, this author has reported on the failure of Florida trial
courts to comply with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in In re
Gaul 8 8 by not properly advising juveniles of their right to counsel. 28 9 In
A.L. v. State,290 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a dispositional
order for failure of the trial court "to renew the offer of counsel to the juve-
nile after [the juvenile] had waived counsel at an earlier proceeding" because
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure compelled the court "to offer coun-
sel at each subsequent stage of the proceedings.,
29
'
B. Dispositional Issues
For a number of years now, the Florida state courts, based on separation
of powers, have refused to intervene and force the state DCF and the state
DJJ to provide appropriate services for children in the care of those two
agencies. In Department of Children & Family Services v. MH.,292 the ap-
pellate court was faced with a petition by the DCF to avoid the obligation to
place four juveniles facing delinquency charges but found to be incompetent,
into appropriate facilities for their treatment.293 Instead, the children were
housed in the local detention center.2 94 Once again commenting on "the cir-
cuit court's impatience with the state of affairs which allows incompetent
children to be warehoused in detention facilities due to insufficient bed space
to begin treatment designed to restore their competency;" the court also
commented on the dilemma faced by the DCF to provide treatment when
sufficient funds have not been allocated. 295 Based on separation of powers
285. T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449,451 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
286. Id.
287. Id.; see E.W. v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
288. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
289. See Dale, supra note 9, at 904.
290. 841 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
291. Id.; see also M.Q. v. State, 818 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
292. 830 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
293. Id. at 850.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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grounds in case law, the appellate court held that the trial court was without
authority to compel the DCF to place the children in programs for which
space is simply not available, citing the variety and number of prior court
cases.296 The problem, of course, has been compounded by the failure of the
federal courts to recognize the problems in the foster care system and the
inability of the state courts to resolve them. In 31 Children v. Bush,2 97 the
Eleventh Circuit recently held that such matters should be resolved in de-
pendency court.29 The catch-22 situation that results is blatant.299
In the adult criminal justice system, defendants receive credit for time
served, which may even include time spent in the mental institution due to
involuntary commitment.3°° However, the juvenile justice system is designed
to rehabilitate youngsters; and therefore, juveniles may be placed in com-
mitment status for indeterminate periods of time.3' But in C.C. v. State,3 °2
the appellate court held that the juvenile was entitled to credit for time spent
in secure detention because the adjudication was a misdemeanor for which
the maximum period of commitment was statutorily limited to one year.
30 3
The juvenile was committed within one year of reaching the age of nine-
teen.3" In this determinate setting, the court held that the credit for time
served was appropriate.3 5
One of the dispositional alternatives available to the court under Florida
306thlaw is restitution. Under the Florida restitution statute found in Chapter
985, the court may, under certain circumstances, in addition to the sanctions
imposed upon the child, order the parent to pay restitution in money or in
296. Id.
297. 329 F.3d 1255 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub. nom. Reggie v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 483
(2003).
298. Id. at 1279.
299. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. 1.C., 742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Bills, 661 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Singletary v.
Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Quiala v. State, 659 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Pelz, 609 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Stoutamire, 602 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. V.L., 583 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Nourse, 437 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
300. See Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 1987).
301. C.C. v. State, 841 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
302. Id. at 657.
303. Id. at 658-59.
304. Id. at 658.
305. Id. 658-59.
306. § 985.231(1)(a)(9).
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kind, for damage which has resulted from the child's offense.3 °7 In Fisher v.
State,"8 the child pleaded no contest and was adjudicated a delinquent and
placed in a Level Four program, resulting from a burglary and arson in which
the child and two others broke into a vacant home and set it on fire, burning
it to the ground. 39 The court order included restitution payable by the par-
ents.310 It was the first notice or statement by the judge or the State that the
mother was to be held personally liable for restitution.31' She failed to make
payment and she was held in contempt.3 2 After entering the order requiring
restitution, the court actually held a restitution hearing in which it heard tes-
timony about its value.3 3 The court entered an order requiring the mother to
pay restitution in the amount of $25,861 and to pay $250 a month.314 The
mother told the judge that her income was $21 per hour and that she could
not afford to pay restitution.315 The statute requires the court to find that the
parent failed to make diligent and good faith efforts to prevent the child from
engaging in the delinquent acts prior to making an order that the parent per-
form community service.316 However, the statute does not explicitly require
a similar finding when the question is one of restitution.31 7 The court re-
manded the case for a hearing because it found that there was no finding
made that the mother failed to make any diligent and good faith effort, that
there was no evidence of her parenting efforts, and because statutes in dero-
gation of the common law ought to be narrowly construed.318 The court also
reversed on due process grounds because the mother had never received no-
tice.319 She was not a party to the daughter's juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing although she appeared in her role as parent and possible witness."' She
might be subjected to an order of restitution as the court's ruling was "with-
out prejudice to the right of the state to seek to reimpose restitution sanc-
tions.., should that be appropriate under the new juvenile rules. '321 The
307. Id.
308. 840 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
309. Id. at 327.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Fisher, 840 So. 2d at 327.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See § 985.23 l(l)(a)(9); Fisher, 840 So. 2d at 329; B.M. v. State, 744 So. 2d 505, 510
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
317. See § 985.231(1)(a)(9).
318. Fisher v. State, 840 So. 2d 325, 329-31 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
319. Id. at 330.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 331.
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problem of notice has been cured since the events that occurred in Fisher,
due to changes to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure requiring the State
to file and serve the petition on the parent or guardian in cases where restitu-
tion or other sanctions are sought against them.322
C. Appellate Issues
In Brazill v. State, a case of wide public interest, in the spring of 2003
the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled on the appeal of Nathaniel Bra-
zill. 323 Brazill was convicted as an adult for second degree murder and ag-
gravated assault with a firearm of shooting and killing a teacher at his middle
school during the 1999-2000 school year. 24 In addition to a claim about
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, Brazill challenged the statute
under which he was charged.325 Specifically, he claimed that the statute,
which allowed him to be charged with a violation of state law punishable by
death or life imprisonment as an adult, thereby denying the rehabilitative
system of the juvenile court, was unconstitutional in violation of due process,
equal protection, and separation of powers.326 The appellate court found that
there was no absolute right at common law or in the constitution to be treated
in the juvenile system, and that nothing contained in Kent v. United States, 327
the Supreme Court opinion on procedural due process in transfer cases, pro-
vided a right to be tried in the juvenile system.2 8 Further, the court held that
no constitutional violation resulted from the prosecutor's use of broad discre-
tion to charge as an adult.329
VI. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Florida Legislature in its 2003 Spring regular session made only
minor changes to laws relating to children in the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems. The Legislature expanded descriptions of persons who hav-
ing mandatory reporting responsibilities with regard to child abuse, aban-
donment or neglect by redrafting section 39.201 of the Florida Statutes. The
322. Id. at 329 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.040, 8.030, 8.031).
323. 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see Steven A. Drizin & Allison
McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule When the Defendant is a
Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV. 507 (2004).
324. Id. at 286.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 383 U.S. 541 (1996).
328. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 288 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-54).
329. Id. at 289.
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Legislature noted that certain persons, under certain circumstances, are not
obligated to make reports to the hotline. 3 ° For example, a professional
working with the DCF need not render a second report where the treatment is
the result of a prior report."' Similarly, court officials are not obligated to
report when there is an ongoing investigation by the DCF or where there is a
dependency case where the matter has previously been reported to the
DCF.332 On the other hand, the Legislature reasserted the notion that com-
munity-based care providers have obligations to report suspected or actual
child abuse, abandonment or neglect.333
The Legislature also slightly expanded the limitations on confidentiality
of reports and records in cases of child abuse or neglect to allow access to
services for victims of domestic violence to attorneys representing a child in
civil and criminal proceedings,34 and to principals of public, private, and
charter schools.335 Chapter 39 was also amended to allow for release of fur-
ther information on children in the foster care system who are found to be
missing.336
Finally, the Legislature passed section 39.8296 of the Florida Statutes,
which created the Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office to oversee the Guard-
ian Ad Litem program.337 Previously, the Guardian Ad Litem program was
"supervised by court administration within the circuit courts;" however, the
Legislature found that "there [was] a perceived conflict of interest created by
the supervision of program staff by the judges before whom they appear. 338
Therefore, the Legislature passed section 39.8296 of the Florida Statutes
with the intent to "place the Guardian Ad Litem Program in an appropriate
place and provide a statewide infrastructure to increase functioning and stan-
dardization among the local programs currently operating in the 20 judicial
circuits. ' ' 339 That location is the Justice Administrative Commission.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has ruled in an important case involving
appellate practice in termination cases, holding that the Anders standard does
330. § 39.201(1)(b).
331. § 39.201(1)(c)-(d).
332. Id.
333. § 39.201(1)(e).
334. § 39.202(2)(5)(d).
335. See § 39.202(2)(p).
336. § 39.202(4).
337. § 39.8296(2).
338. § 39.8296(1)(b).
339. § 39.8296(1)(d).
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not apply to lawyers who seek to withdraw where there is no colorable ap-
peal for a client in a termination of parental rights case. 34' The application of
the Padgett doctrine continues to be an issue discussed by the appellate
courts in dependency and termination cases. 4 In delinquency matters, the
appellate courts continue its longstanding effort to hold the trial courts ac-
countable for compliance with the variety of procedural obligations under
Florida law.342 The Legislature moved the state office of guardian ad litem
from the Supreme Court to a freestanding agency.
343
340. N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (Fla. 2003).
341. See, e.g., P.S. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 825 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2002); O.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002); M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 826 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
342. See, e.g., A.L. v. State, 841 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
343. § 39.8296.
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